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OVERVIEW
The relationship between infrastructure and 
economic growth (generally and for 
telecommunications in particular)
Regulation and infrastructure investment:
what we have learned from its application int 
he telecommunications industry
• over time
• under uncertainty
• as technological and economic circumstances 
in the industry change
WHAT IS THE ‘PROBLEM’?
Maximising economic growth (actual and 
potential)
Via efficient investment in infrastructure (the 
„right‟ amount‟ invested in the „right‟ 
technologies at the „right‟ time)
INFRASTRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Spillover effects
investment yields economic benefits beyond cost 
of project
But only to the extent that there were (underinvestment) 
frictions originally (or anticipated shortly)
marginal benefit of investment decreases as more 
projects are deployed 
if no/few material infrastructure bottlenecks to 
begin with, or complementary assets are costly 
(or under-developed) then investing „too early‟ 
(i.e. ahead of demand and complements 
materialising) may be very costly
BROADBAND INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH: A CAVEAT
Does broadband investment drive economic growth?
Or is broadband investment more likely to occur in areas 
where economic growth is already strong?
Empirical evidence:
equivocal (at least in developed countries)
but generally exhibiting decreasing returns (Gillet, et 
al), asset complementarities (Greenstein)
network speed may only be indirectly linked to 
economic growth (Grimes et al 2009; Kenney & 
Kenney, 2010)
A BROADBAND ‘PRODUCTIVITY 
PARADOX’? (Howell & Grimes, 2010)
Gains undetected?
too soon to discern benefits
not easily discernable/measurable
accrue outside ambit of study
Broadband not as productive as we would like?
one-off adjustments, not sustainable growth engines
decreasing marginal returns relative to costs (most of the 
gains came from early technologies and applications)
data transport only a small part of the production function
Negative spillovers?
BUT ASSUMING THERE ARE REAL GAINS 
‘ON THE TABLE’
Will regulation (of any type) assist in ensuring 
that appropriate, timely investments 
improving economic growth prospects are 
made in a technologically dynamic 
environment where great uncertainties exist?
THE INFRASTRUCTURE COST ‘PROBLEM’
Large fixed, sunk costs (economies of scale) lead 
to risks of:
underinvestment (missing market, incomplete coverage 
and loss of spillover benefits) or
overinvestment (stranded assets)
Telecommunications characteristics
distinct network effects relating to:
infrastructure (interconnecting networks of differing 
ownership and technologies)
applications (interlinked demand for content and 
connections (two-sided market)
HISTORY OF INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATION 
The „sunk cost problem‟
very high fixed, sunk costs => scale economies
firms with market power => allocatively inefficient
Assumption of intractable natural monopoly:
competing infrastructures will never be economically 
efficient
regulation is needed to ensure
(a) investments are made in the first place
(b) inefficient duplication is prevented
REGULATORY ‘SOLUTIONS’
Historic focus has been on networks
in voice telephony environment, integrated operators 
provided both network and application (there was no 
need for the network if customer did not also 
purchase a voice application)
With only one technology and one application
fixed line copper-based voice telephony only (yet now 
similar quality access can be provided to multiple 
third-party applications over mobile, satellite, 
wireless, cable, fibre as well as copper)
SOLUTION #1: GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP 
OF MONOPOLY FIRM, REGULATED 
PROTECTION FROM COMPETITION
Focus on prices paid by consumers – likely 
closer to cost
although price discrimination quite likely – e.g. 
discounts for elderly pensioners in order to 
increase total uptake; Ramsey prices
But diffuse (communal) ownership, absence of 
competition lead to lead to productive, 
dynamic inefficiencies 
consumers still pay higher prices than necessary
risk of pursuit of political objectives overriding 
pursuit of economic objectives (e.g. picking 
politically preferred technologies, allocating 
investment for electoral purposes)
SOLUTION #2: REGULATED PRIVATE 
MONOPOLY FRANCHISE
Focus is on restricting monopoly firm‟s profits
rate-of-return regulation
Private owners exert stronger internal disciplines
addresses productive inefficiencies
But dynamic efficiency problems remain
either gold-plated‟ (over) investment or delays in 
investment in new technologies
underinvestment in research and development
SOLUTION #3: INCENTIVE REGULATION
Incentive theory – losses will be minimised if the entity 
controlling the level of the incidence of the risk bears 
the costs of invoking it
Endeavours to replicate incentives in a competitive 
market
decreasing regulated price path emulates market 
incentives from continual cost control, 
technological innovation
regulatory entry barriers can be removed 
SOLUTION #3 (cont)
Shifts costs of inefficient investment decisions, r&d risk 
onto private owners 
incentives to invest better aligned with consumers, 
total welfare
profits increase when desirable decisions made (in 
respect of matters which the firm CAN control) 
Enables actual competitive entry to occur when 
economically feasible
regulatory entry barriers can be removed
BUT EXPOSES OWNERS TO RISKS THEY 
HAVE LIMITED ABILITY TO INFLUENCE
Demand-side uncertainty
consumer valuations of firm‟s products, services
consumer valuations of other commercial products and services 
utilising the firm‟s products and services as inputs (derived 
demand)
Supply-side uncertainty
industry-wide technological innovation
new (substitute and complementary) products and services
Regulatory uncertainty
regulatory intensity increases only if „good‟ outcomes occur
regulator has more/better information than when firm made investment 
decision
risk exacerbated the greater the economies of scale available (Evans 
& Guthrie, 2006)
UNCERTAINTY AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATION
The greater the pace of technological innovation, the 
greater are all three uncertainties
Regulatory risk exacerbated 
Regulator faces same uncertainties as firm (serial 
correlation)
how to assess a „fair‟ risk component to include in 
regulated prices?
cost-based regulated prices exclude compensation for the 
firm bearing costs of „exogenous‟ risk (Hausman & Sidak, 
2005)
RISK ALLOCATION AFFECTS INVESTMENT 
DECISION
Usual response to decision-making under 
uncertainty is to wait for better information (Dixit & 
Pindyck, 1996)
firm refrains from investing until uncertainty reduced to 
level for which it is compensated under regulated prices
welfare accruing from deployment of new technologies forfeited
but risk of regulator also becoming better informed and 
increasing regulatory ratchet intensity increases
political assurances of regulatory forbearance insufficient
no government can bind its successors (Howell, 2010). 
DEMAND-SIDE UNCERTAINTY
Hypothetical example #1: fibre to the home 
connections
Regulator assumes take-up is 70% of households
take-up substantially slower than initial estimates
actual cost substantially higher than regulated price as 
scale effects smaller
regulated firm makes substantial loss
flow-on effect: firm reluctant to invest in another new 
technology unless compensated for bearing risk 
(likewise any other firm likely to obtain a dominant 
position from investing in a new technology likely to 
become subject to regulation) (Crandall, 2002)
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE #2: FIBRE TO 
THE FIRM CONNECTIONS
Regulator assumes take-up is 30% of firm; sets price 
accordingly
take-up is 70% of firms
regulated firm is making profits at regulated price
Regulator revises regulated price downward to new cost
but if firm is a „portfolio‟ investor - #1 above
must bear down-side unpredictable demand-side 
risks but cannot appropriate gains from up-side 
(i.e. ex post expropriation of the returns to the 
firm‟s „risk premium‟) 
firms will not assume investment risks in future => 
missing market for infrastructure investment
SUPPLY SIDE UNCERTAINTIES
„Sunk cost problem‟ – what is the „right‟ price to 
set?
Long Run Incremental Cost - but which one?
historic cost?
firm has no incentive to invest in newer, cheaper 
technologies
but competitor might, even though incumbent has 
not recovered full investment cost (inefficient entry)
continually decreasing price path
should encourage incumbent firm to invest in new 
technologies at appropriate time
EXAMPLE #1: PRE-ANNOUNCED 
REGULATORY PRICE PATH
Regulator overestimates extent of savings available 
from innovation (Regulatory error – not in firm‟s 
control)
over-aggressive decreasing price path
no new cheaper technologies to invest 
firm cannot recover costs; suspends investment, 
ultimately exits market 
EXAMPLE #2: AGGRESSIVE PACE OF 
INDUSTRY INNOVATION
Means infrastructure cost falls substantially more over time 
than estimated in the original price path
„historic cost‟ problem meets „bad news‟ principle 
(Guthrie, 2003)
Regulated price above the new price required to send 
signal to invest
Regulatory response: reset regulated price to the price for 
today‟s technically efficient LRIC
stops entrants from inefficiently investing
but incumbent cannot recover actual (historic) costs incurred under 
this price (bears all risks of unanticipated price reductions), so 
runs down infrastructure, does not reinvest 
ACCESS REGULATION EXACERBATES 
INCENTIVE PROBLEMS
Entrants buy from incumbent at regulated prices
Regulated prices continually adjusted to reflect „best 
available technology
why would entrants ever invest in their own infrastructure 
(even if it could be the best available)?
sinking own costs => taking on risk
regulation offers competitors „risk-free‟ option to 
enter/exit market 
incumbent bears all risk in the sector, but receives no 
compensation for bearing it, plus cannot recover 
costs under regulated prices
no evidence of „ladder of investment‟ being climbed 
(Bourreau & Dogan, 2010)
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Total investment (both entrants and incumbents) less in 
heavily access-regulated EU countries than less-
aggressively regulated countries (Renda, 2006; Grajek & Roller, 
2009; Crandall, 2009)
No compelling evidence that access regulation has had 
a material effect on number of broadband 
connections sold (Boyle et al, 2008)
only interplatform competition has consistent 
statistically significant effect (Distasio, et al. 2005; Bouckaert 
et al, 2010)
STRUCTURAL SEPARATION EXACERBATES 
ACCESS REGULATION INCENTIVE PROBLEMS
Infrastructure company cannot compete in retail markets
but bears industry uncertainty risks – both demand and 
supply
retailers bear no risks (mismatch of investment 
horizons)
“Too many” retailers enter the market (Howell, Meade & O‟Connor, 
2010)
none takes adequate account of effect of their entry on 
residual demand remaining to other entrants 
(monopolistic competition with low fixed costs)
few incentives to take care in forecasts
strategic incentives to over-estimate demand to induce low 
regulated price
STRUCTURAL SEPARATION EXACERBATES 
(CONT) 
But infrastructure company must meet all forward 
orders (without own retail arm for „reality check‟ of 
demands) – regulatory condition
Inefficient overinvestment occurs
demands inevitably „fail to materialise‟ at projected 
level
many retailers exit
infrastructure investor left with surplus capacity 
(stranded assets)
US Dot-com „bubble‟/‟bust‟ 1996-2002 (Crandall, 2002)
STRUCTURAL SEPARATION EXACERBATES 
(CONT)
Might overcome some problems by requiring retailers to 
enter into long term contracts with infrastructure 
company
but if industry is technologically dynamic, a new 
(bypass) infrastructure may be developed
retailers „locked in‟ to long-term contracts with 
current incumbent will be „undercut‟ by new 
entrant retailers using new technology
if probability of new infrastructure development is high, 
then retailers will not enter into long-term contracts
reduces likelihood of investment in current technology by 
separated infrastructure firm   
CONCLUSION
Most current regulatory theory developed in times, 
industries, where pace of technological change was slow
The greater the pace of change in an industry, the greater 
the risk of „getting the regulation wrong‟
• genuinely unpredictable uncertainties cannot be 
abstracted away
Regulation (in its currently popular forms  (access 
regulation and structural separation) is likely hampering 
the pursuit of economically efficient investment
creating a „missing market for investment‟
has been used to „justify‟ a return to government 
financing (NZ) and operation (Australia) of NBNs
The greatest uncertainties are generated by competition 
from (currently unregulated) mobile and cable 
infrastructures
CONCLUSION (cont)
Need to rethink
what is being regulated
why it is being regulated
whether (historic) underlying assumptions are 
valid in the „new world‟
Failure to do so may be costly in terms of 
economic growth potential arising from 
telecommunications infrastructure investment
